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A CASE FOR CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
When you wish to produce a result by means of an
instrument, do not allow yourself to complicate It by
introducing many subsidiary parts, but follow the
briefest way possible, and do not act as those who
when the do not know how to express a thing ...
proceed by a method of circumlocution and with great
prolixity and confusion. - -^ — •sp—— - —-
-Leonardo da Vinci*
INTRODUCTION AND SYNOPSIS
The result we wish to produce is obviously improved
environmental quality, perhaps even the lofty objective of
"productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his
environment . ..." 2 Our instruments, at least within the scope
of this article, are "the fine quillets of the law", 3 but any
logical person considering the past two decades of federal
environmental regulation and enforcement, the present
"incredibly complicated mix of environmental laws at the
national level...", -* and the complications imposed by
federalism55 and federal facilities'* would have to conclude that
we have certainly failed to follow da Vinci's admonition to
keep it simple. This article goes one step past these
observations to conclude that not only have we simply failed to
keep it simple, but we have also, by deluding ourselves into
believing that the differences between civil and criminal
enforcement are little more than mere procedural distinctions
surrounding the differing burdens of proof * and that criminal
enforcement Is so inherently difficult and time consuming that

it is not worth the trouble,® unnecessarily complicated our




izat ion of available criminal enforcement
provisions has not gone unnoticed, at least from the
perspective of the efficient utilization of legal resources,
and the Land Division of the Department of Justice has even
issued a formal directive requiring that [wlhen both civil
and criminal actions are possible- for a single" statute, a
criminal proceeding should generally be brought and resolved
before a civil action," 10 unless protection of public health
or preservation of the environment necessitates injunctive
relief. 11 The Environmental Protection Agency is also
"steadily increasing its commitment to environmental
enforcement," 12 and statistics on enforcement actions show an
increased emphasis on criminal enforcement. 13 It is the
purpose of this paper to provide appropriate legal and logical
foundations to support this observed increase in the number of
environmental cases resolved by criminal enforcement of federal
statutes and to illustrate that because of its inherent
simplicity and retributive/deterrent value, 1 ** criminal
enforcement, particularly against responsible individuals 13 is
an essential tool of environmental enforcement which should
always be considered early in the enforcement process. Toward
that end we will - with the benefit of a brief consideration of
the philosophy of environmental enforcement and a brief

discussion of problems recently encountered In civil
enforcement actions - examine the historical development and
the present Judicial climate surrounding the criminal
enforcement provisions of the principle federal environmental
statutes. We will then evaluate potential affirmative
defenses and procedural and evidentiary concerns in an effort
to demonstrate, through comparison to civil enforcement and
analogy to enforcement under other "general welfare statutes,"
that the perceptions and legal conclusions uporv which the
preferences for civil remedies have been based are largely
i 1 lusionary
.
lA This conclusion will be supported by
illustrations of three specific situations, those involving the
"midnight dumper" 17', the unrepentant permit holder 1- and
federally owned or operated f aci 1 1 t ies, 1 9 in which enforcement
of federal criminal statutes is not merely the sanction of
choice but the only effective sanction.
PHILOSOPHIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
While no discussion of the nature of society's actions to
solve problems, real or imagined, can be complete without some
understanding of the Jurisprudential underpinnings of our
decision making processes, too extensive a consideration may
destroy our focus and bog us down in the infinitely ponderable
question of the distinction, if any, "between what law is and
what it ought to be." 20 For simplicity we shall assume
realistic validity of the underlying statutory schemes and

limit our philosophical Introduction to a discussion of the
assumptions underlying conclusions about the relative merits
and appropriate uses of civil and criminal enforcement.
The Historical Perspective
The appealing simplicity of the use of criminal sanctions
under modern federal environmental law, specifically the Air
Quality Act of 1967, was recognized as early as 1968, 21 but it
was not long before commentators began to condemn the
retributive nature and the cumbersome procedural aspects of
criminal penalties and to suggest the almost exclusive use of
civil penalties instead. 22 Civil penalties were, the
commentators argued, essentially economic and , therefore, better
suited to penalize undesirable actions which were essentially
economic and in which the guaranteed rights of criminal
procedure were simply unnecessary baggage. 23 In the early
1970's these essentially practical arguments for exclusive or
nearly exclusive civil enforcement were weakened somewhat by the
unexpected effectiveness of the resurrection of the Refuse Act
of 1899. 2 -»
The Refuse Act (actually the common name for section 13 of
the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899) 2S , was
originally part of a statutory scheme intended to protect the
navigability of the nation's waters and allow in rem actions
for the removal of wrecks and other hazards to navigation. 2 **
Misdemeanor criminal sanctions 27' and reward or "qui tarn"

provisions20 were Included In the act .presumably to aid In
enforcement and deter the deliberate introduction of refuse
into the navigable waters of the United States, but in the late
sixties and early seventies the misdemeanor criminal sanctions
were used effectively to punish pollution of navigable waters
by some very large industrial concerns, 29 even though the
"refuse" introduced was not a direct hazard to navigation. 30
At the time, commentators, principally those supporting civil
penalties, attributed the success of criminal prosecu-t ions under
the Refuse Act to the fact that no mental element was required
by the statute. 31 This made criminal prosecution simple but,
in their opinion, not worthy of pursuit because the penalties
under the act were not the severe economic sanctions necessary
to deter large corporate polluters. 32
The Liberal/Utilitarian Approach
After the early successes of criminal enforcement under
"that sparkling innovation in antipollution legislation of the
McKinley Administration," 33 were stymied by the passage of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (now commonly referred to
as the Clean Water Act ) 3,a and philosophical arguments
supporting civil enforcement for all economic legislation
Including environmental laws came increasingly into vogue, 33
criminal penalties were generally rejected as inappropriate
sanctions which involved unnecessary conclusions about the
morality of conduct which was principally economic in nature. 3*

Unfortunately for effective criminal enforcement, this
liberal/utilitarian approach to environmental enforcement, which
rejected moral Judgments associated with criminal law and
substituted for them civil determinations of utility, 3"
prevailed while most of the statutory and administrative
schemes for the control of air and water pollution were
developed. 30 Only, after the great^ hazardous waste "scares" 3*
reawakened interest In criminal enforcement at the federal
level* did Congress enact and .then amend This Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, The Comprehensive Environmental
Response and Compensation Act, The Clean Water Act and The
Toxic Substances Control Act* 1 to create what most wanted to
believe was a "cradle to grave" scheme for control of toxic
substances. -*2
But criminal enforcement was never totally without its
champions. One of the best demonstrations of a consistent
political will for criminal enforcement of environmental
laws is the Congressional reaction to the Supreme Courts
formal istic resolution of a criminal prosecution under the
1970 version of The Clean Air Act. In Adamo Wrecking Co.. v.
United States * 3 the Supreme Court narrowly construed the term
"emission standard" under the act thereby frustrating the
criminal prosecution of Adamo Wrecking for asbestos related
crimes.** Congress soon thereafter amended The Clean Air Act
to prevent such formal lstlc outcomes In the future.* 3 Congress
was apparently determined to enforce environmental statutes

through the use of criminal sanctions, and the prosecutors and
the courts eventually began to get the message.** Recent
amendments to other environmental statutes and proposed
legislation are sending the same message.
The Retributive Approach
Congress was not satisfied with merely closing loopholes
in the existing environmental statutes.* 7" To enhance the
pervasive scheme described above, Congress continues to fine
tune the principle environmental statutes to enhance effective
criminal enforcement by both substantive changes to the nature
of the crime**3 and increased penalties, particularly for repeat
offenders.** The extensive criminal penalties under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act were added by the 1984
amendment 150 and the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization
Act of 1986. =x The criminal penalties, under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, for
failure to report releases of hazardous substances were created
by the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986=2
and The Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986s3 was
clearly an effort to get the substantial criminal enforcement
provisions of the Toxic Substances Control Act focused on that
substance. 3*
But the latest amendments to the Clean Water Act are
perhaps the piece de resistance of criminal enforcement
.
ss In
the 1987 amendments the distinction between negligent and

knowing violations has been made clear, 3 * criminal penalties
have been significantly increased, 517' and a crime of knowing
endangerment has been added. 30 The 1987 amendment also
delineates a new type of disposal offense by prohibiting the
unpermitted introduction of hazardous substances or pollutants
into sewer systems or publicly owned treatment works. This
change alone would seem at first blush to foreclose yet
another environmentally unsound method of disposing of
hazardous waste, but the new provisions contain significant
limitations. The introduction of "the pollutant or hazardous
substance" will only be punishable if the introduction "causes
the treatment works to violate any effluent limitation or
condition in [its] ... permit. "^ While it does not take much
imagination to foresee the practical difficulties involved In
Investigating and proving such an offense,* criminal
enforcement efforts are already underway.* 1 Fortunately, other
environmental statutes do not present such problems if the
resources for adequate investigation are available.
From recent developments it appears that these practical
resources will be increased. In order to implement the
extensive criminal provisions of the 1984 amendments to the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, The Department of
Justice has, as required by statute,*2 delegated full law
enforcement authority to the Environmental Protection Agency's
National Enforcement Investigation Center Special Agents,* 3
and other federal enforcement agencies have also begun to
8

increase criminal investigation efforts in the environmental
area.* 1* In order to prosecute these case effectively and
"convey a message of serious intent to the regulated community"
the Department of Justice has created an Environmental Crimes
Section within its Land and Natural Resources Division. *s Such
practical concerns are not without value to our evaluation of
the philosophical basis of criminal enforcement. It has long
been persuasively argued that there is no better indicator of
the true political will of a society -than the allocation of its
law enforcement assets.**
The Jurisprudential Conclusions
What is interesting to note in light of this paper's
postulate is that even though the recent amendments discussed
above have added emphasis to criminal enforcement, both the
Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, the principle federal
environmental statutes in effect during the period of criminal
enforcement's intellectual disfavor, contained misdemeanor
criminal penalties. However, these provisions, despite early
successes with prosecutions under the Clean Water Act,* 7" never
seemed to attract the prosecutorial interest due them.*s The
point is that: society, through its recognized processes, had
already condemned polluting activities in violation of the
statute as criminal.'**' A person of an essentially practical
bent might boll down these two decades of discussions filled
with high sounding jurisprudential rhetoric and debates about

economic law to a simple failure to enforce the retributive
provisions of the statutes on the part of those duly appointed
to do so.
As the courts have long recognized "the general
unsui tabi 1 i ty for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse
enforcement," 7' the decision(s) not to use criminal enforcement
provisions Is more political than Jurisprudential. The
relatively recent resurgence of criminal enforcement In what
has been described as a period of general deregulation of
private business (and some would say disregard for the
environmental concerns) 7" 1 may be distillation of natural law
concepts to their ultimate logical result, 7" 2 an enlightened
utilitarianism which requires the moral behavior of the
individual, as determined by society as a whole, to preserve
the general welfare 7"3 , or simply a political reaction to , ,
,
the growth of a compelling bipartisan public sentiment in
favor of vigorous enforcement...." 7"'*
Whatever the philosophical basis for increased criminal
enforcement, we are beginning to see that civil enforcement Is
not the trouble free compliance procedure theorist have touted
It to be, 7=s and for unpermitted, unrepentant or federal
polluters, civil enforcement may not provide effective
sanctions. On the other hand, criminal sanctions can provide
society with the simple and effective enforcement tools
necessary to prove society's concern to potential offenders.
This is particularly true when criminal enforcement is the only
10

practical sanction. We will look In detail at such cases
below, but first we will make a more detailed examination of
the problems recently encountered in civil enforcement under
the existing statutes by which Congress hoped to successfully
regulate all potential methods of the introduction of
pollutants into the environment. 7**
CONCERNS IN CIVIL ENFORCEMENT
We should first acknowledge that a rational an'd effective
regulatory scheme is essential to both civil and criminal
enforcement. 7''' But because we tend intuitively to associate
the development of a comprehensive regulatory scheme with civil
enforcement ,'*e we may overlook some of the shortcomings of
civil enforcement.
The Limitations of Civil Enforcement
Reliance upon civil enforcement puts the burden of
education in the regulatory scheme on the government agency -
and its principle, society - not on the regulated "persons". 79
The apparent regulatory choice between statutorily created
penalties is really only the manifestation of the much broader
issue of who will bear the insult of ignorance or disregard of
the law or the duly promulgated regulations which the courts
have treated as synonymous. 80 There are two choices. Under an
enforcement scheme which relies on warnings followed by
escalating civil penalties, society will bear the burden of
11

pollution born of ignorance, real or feigned, but when
criminal penalties are invoked, the corporate and natural
persons responsible (for the corporate or governmental "person"
may act only through its agents® 1 ) may be held accountable for
knowledge of and compliance with society's standards.
Recognizing this apparent inequity, proponents of civil
enforcement hold up the significant financial penalties
provided by statute02 as the method by which wrongs committed by
corporate and governmental bodies might be redressed, 03 but
such assertions may not survive closer scrutiny. As our
regulatory schemes developed it became apparent that civil
penalties, unless they are so extensive that operation of the
regulated entity becomes economically impractical, may in
reality be more license than sanction. " The characterization
of civil penalties as economic disincentives rather than legal
sanctions breaches the sea wall of practicality which holds
back a veritable ocean of economic theory surrounding the "use
of market forces to achieve environmental goals with minimal
economic cost. Me!5
We may, however, avoid a lengthy discourse on such
theories by noting that the discontent with legalism which has
led some to propose or embrace complex economic theories, *
often ignores the facts of economic and regulatory life. 07' The
observation that our economy is a hybrid of many Inconsistent
economic models is not a new one, 00 but as environmental
regulation becomes more pervasive distinctions in the manner in
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which certain groups or types of polluters react to economic
disincentives will become more and more pronounced. Some major
sources of pollution such as - private and public utilities,
federal activities and contractors, and socially important but
marginally profitable high pollution industries can not
rationally be expected to adhere to traditional economic
models, and may in fact ignore some laws and regulations
altogether. Because we are not yet ingenious enough to
decipher these complex politico-economic relationships, there
is often no viable economic alternative, and some form of
"command and control" regulation would appear to be
essential . &*
In response to this dilemma injunctive relief and its
administrative equivalent, compliance orders, have been
created by statute and employed to ensure that corporate or
government "persons" and their employees comply with law or
regulation,*" regardless of economic advantage. But the use
of legal orders to compel compliance has encountered two very
significant problems. First, injunctive relief is not a
realistic alternative for certain activities, for example
public utilities and certain essential functions of the federal
government
,
9i and second, efforts to obtain injunctive relief
or to gain approval of regulations which permit civil




Some have argued that these philosophical and practical
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drawbacks to civil enforcement are temporary, lasting only
until societal and economic pressures ensure voluntary
compliance" 3 and that they are far outweighed by the procedural
simplicity of a civil enforcement system in full flower.*"* If
as a practical matter this were true, perhaps criminal
penalties would not be a viable alternative, but in the civil
enforcement arena it seems that Murphy's second law always
prevails: "Nothing is ever as simple as it seems."*
The Procedural Difficulties in Civil Enforcement
We have already noted the practical problems caused by
lengthy civil actions and the limits of reason on injunctive
relief, to these the Supreme Court in Tull v. United States
has added, at least under the Clean Water Act, the procedural
burden of trial by jury.** It is indeed interesting to note
that avoidance of the Jury and its attendant procedural
difficulties was one of the early practical arguments for
preference to civil enforcement , 9T Worthy of note is the
observation that the court in Tul
1
analogized to the criminal
law's general provision for sentencing by the Judge to avoid a
right to trial by Jury on the amount of the civil penalty."®
While valid criticisms of the of the civil enforcement systems
do not necessarily validate emphasis on criminal enforcement,
the question we must answer is this: If criminal and civil
enforcement are equally difficult or simple to implement should
we not chose the enforcement technique with the best deterrent
14

potential? Having asked, we turn to the principle enforcement
statutes available, and examine the potential affirmative
defenses, and procedural and evidentiary concerns to determine
if criminal enforcement is indeed simple enough to be
worthwhi le.
PRINCIPLE FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
As they have developed historically the principle criminal
provisions may be divided into five categories:
1. Those designed to directly protect the safety of individuals;
These provisions in the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act and The Clean Water Act are commonly called knowing
endangerment provisions,*''' The Clean Air Act, possibly
because of its technocratic approach of computerized
modeling against ambient standards as a method of
enforcement, does not contain such a provision,* 00 but the
most recent revisions proposed in Congress Include a
"knowing endangerment" crime. 101
2. Those designed too ensure compliance with an administrative
regulatory program;
For example, The Clean Water Act, 102 The Clean Air Act, 103
The Ocean Dumping Act, 10 "* and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act 10=s contain criminal provisions prohibiting the
knowing conduct of regulated activities without a permit
and "knowing" and/or "willful" permit, and "interim
15

status" violations. 10 * The Clean Water Act, like Its
ancestor the Refuse Act of 1899, also authorizes
punishment for such activities even if they are committed
through negl lgence. lo ^
3. Those designed to protect specific places or things;
The Endangered Species Act loe prohibits the "taking" of an
endangered species or destruction of its habitat. 10 * The
Prevention of Pollution From Ships Act 110 will protect the
high seas upon implementation of the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL Protocol). 111 The purpose of The Safe Drinking
Water Act is obvious from its common name, 112 and various
other statutes protect the public land both from some uses
and users under regulations Implemented by the
administering agency. 113
4. Those designed to deal with specific hazardous substances;
The Toxic Substances Control Act contains a provision
which prohibits acts in violation of administrative
regulations concerning certain substances found by the
agency or determined by Congress to be toxic. 11 * The
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act requires regulation
of "hazardous waste." 113 The Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act is focused directly on
control of these substances. 11 * The Atomic Energy Act
prohibits unauthorized handling of radioactive
materials. 117* Other specific legislation requiring
16

regulation of the disposal of "health care facility
waste" has been strongly supported In Congress. 1 1B
5. Those designed to aid in enforcement;
These provisions commonly prohibit knowing submission of
false statements to regulatory agencies and make criminal
the failure to properly maintain the records required by
law or regulation, 119" and for those media in which
immediate containment or clean up is technologically
possible notification of the -discharge or release of
certain substances is required. 120
It might be argued intuitively that civil enforcement
could reach these same ends 121 but civil enforcement actions
cannot benefit from the full panoply of criminal statutes.
These general federal criminal offenses serve two purposes.
Practically, because juries, and perhaps even defense
lawyers, 122 are more comfortable when traditional criminal
offenses are charged, they make prosecution simpler and,
therefore, guilty pleas are more likely, but, Just as
importantly, they serve as philosophical notice that a felony
is a felony whether Congress adopted it from the common law or
created It out of concern for modern technology as a threat to
the environment.
OTHER FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTES
The following general criminal statutes have been or can




Aiding and abetting another in the commission of a criminal
act 123 - This fundamental criminal statute allows participants
at any stage of the environmental crime to be prosecuted as
principles even if their participation is not the criminal
act. 12*
False claims against the government of the United
States, 123 and theft or conversion of public monies 12* — These
statutes are particularly effective, against contractors who
file false claims for payments associated with the handling and
disposal of waste generated by the federal government or clean
up of hazardous waste sites under the Comprehensive
Environmental Resource and Conservation Act. 12 ''
Conspiracy 1" — Almost every major criminal violation of
environmental laws could logically be the object of a
conspiracy and the offense is often charged both to support the
presentation of the case by permitting the introduction of
evidence that might otherwise be excluded as hearsay and to
establish a story line of guilty knowledge and behavior. 12y
The offense may also be utilized to enhance punishment as
conspiracy is generally considered a separate offense. 130
False statement in any proceeding before any agency or
department of the United State 131 — false statements in civil
enforcement proceeding would also be criminal under these
provisions, 132 and felony punishment may also be available. 133
Mail and wire fraud 13 * — These statutes have been used to
18

prosecute environmental criminals who have systematically
used the malls or electronic means, usually the telephone, to
arrange contracts for purportedly legal transport, treatment
or disposal of waste. ia=
Obstruction of administrative proceeding13* — This
statute has obvious application to permit proceeding, but may
have increased value as hazardous waste facilities begin to face
loss of their interim status under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (LOIS) program. 137"
Perjury 13® — This statute has specific application to
Judicial actions arising from civil enforcement or challenges
to regulations, 13 " but it is also effective in breaking down
conspiracies to deceive grand Juries, which is particularly
important in the corporate context. l *°
Contempt of court 1 "* 1 -- This statute has also been
effectively used to assist in grand Jury invest i gat ion, 1-* 2 but
the fact that "punishment for contempt of court and a
conviction under indictment for the same acts are not within
the protection of the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy" may make contempt proceedings particularly
useful when the criminal act also violates an injunct ion .*
Federal Assimilative Crimes Act 1 ** — This statute has
limited territorial application, in that it applies only
to geographic areas under exclusive federal Jurisdiction, but
it does allow for the dynamic application of state law to acts
committed under such jurisdiction, and may, therefore, have
19

particular application to federal employees (military or
civilian) who commit environmental crimes 1 "*3
In addition to these statutes of general applicability two
other groups of arguably useful statutes, which would produce
two disparate groups of criminal defendants, are interesting
enough to warrant more extensive discussion. The first of
these is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO). 1 ** Ever since control of the disposition of toxic
waste became a major issue, there .have been allegations that
"organized crime" controls and profits from the business of
hazardous waste disposal. 1 '* 7' Some formal studies indicate that
this is not the case, 1 * 8 finding instead that the "offending
businesses . . . demonstrated fairly low organizational
complexity." 1 **' In either case as disposal of waste becomes a
more and more complex process 130 racketeering prosecutions are
certain to be a part of the future of criminal enforcement in
the environmental area. 131
The second group of statutes is the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ). 132 Under the General Article, 133
active duty personnel are subject to trial by court-martial for
all non-capital federal crimes, including those acts made
criminal by the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act. 13 *
Additionally, violations of orders concerning proper
environmental practices could result in prosecutions under
Article 92 of the code. 133 Given the fact that active duty
personnel face not two, but, three potential forums, if
20

prosecutorial Interest In federal facility compliance with
environmental laws continues to increase, uniformed offenders
are not likely to escape notice. 1S*
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Having identified the potentially applicable statutes we
can turn our attention to a generalized discussion of the
Judicial construction of environmental statutes and to what are
commonly referred to as the elements of the offense as they
support our thesis of the simplicity and effectiveness of
criminal enforcement.
The Scope of the Statutes
Regrettably for persuasive presentation, efforts to impose
criminal sanctions under environmental statutes which showed
much promise, beginning with the sweeping interpretation given
the criminal provisions of The Refuse Act, 107" have been at
times unnecessarily complicated by formal istic constructions of
certain provisions which limit the practical scope of the
statute. 1=5e Sometimes narrow or formal istic constructions
of the trial court are later corrected by a courts of appeal. 10 *'
But, with the marked exception of United States v. Adamo
Wrecking Co. . 1<& ° on the occasions when formalism prevails on
appeal, it is usually directed at the application of the statute
to corporate or other "persons" created by legal fictions. 1 * 1
The courts have even gone so far as to suggest, as this paper
21

does, the prosecution of the natural persons responsible for the
criminal violation. 1 *2 If the broad interpretation given to
the term "person" under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act by United States v. Johnson & Towers Inc. 1 * 3 is a sign of
the legal pattern which is emerging, the prosecution of the
natural persons responsible for pollution will not face
obstacles created by narrow statutory construction. Nowhere is
this willingness of the courts to simplify the application of
the statutes and Jeave the questions of guilt to the Jury 1A*
more important or apparent than in the articulation of the
mental element necessary for the commission of various
environmental crimes.
The Mental Elements Required
Both the requirement for and the magnitude of criminal
intent required for conviction under the various environmental
acts has been a concern for nearly two decades. **B During the
resurgence of The Refuse Act, 1 ** commentators noted the strict
liability standard imposed by the act, 1 * 7" terming enforcement
of the act the rejection of the requirement for "scienter", or
a knowing act, 1 *® This standard was not carried over into the
criminal provisions of the 1972 version of The Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, but the act did establish criminal
penalties for negligent violations, 1 *'' and the government
enjoyed notable success prosecuting cases under that
standard. 1 " The 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act
22

maintained the negligence standard, but, rephrased the criminal
provisions to establish separate statutory subsections for
"negligent" and "knowing" viol at ions wi th an attendant Increase
In the severity of potential punishments for the latter,
thereby deleting the concept of "willful" violations. 1 '' 1 While
"willful" and "knowing" have been held to be nearly synonymous
for purposes of public welfare statutes, 1 "2 this change is a
sign of the developing consistency and associated simplicity in
environmental criminal enforcement provisions.
Though the effective prosecutions of misdemeanors based on
negligence have been an important part of the history of the
Clean Water Act, 1 "3 the other principle environmental statutes
punish only a "knowing" of f ense. 1 "'4 Because, Congress has
not seen fit to incorporate the negligence standard into other
statutes, 1 " 55 and because the negligence offenses under the
Clean Water Act are only misdemeanors, 1 "* it is the scope of
the scienter requirement under the knowing standard which
serves as the major distinction of criminal enforcement and to
which we now turn our attention.
This issue has best been addressed in criminal cases
enforcing the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Both
United States v. Johnson & Towers. Inc. and United States v.
Haves Int / 1 . Corp. recognized the public health concerns
addressed by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, but
addressed the resolution of the issue in different ways. 1 "" The
apparent difficulty in resolving the two cases may be more
23

procedural than substantive. Johnson & Towers Inc. sustained
the government's interlocutory appeal of the dismissal of
three counts of the indictments against two natural persons 1 ^°
after the accused corporation which employed the individual
defendants pled guilty, while Haves Int' 1 Corp. reversed
"judgments of acquittal not withstanding the Jury verdict"
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 17'*' in favor of
both the named corporation and individual defendants employed
by it. Because the decision in Johnson & Towers Ipc. was one
of preliminary statutory interpretation based only upon the
bare assertions contained in the indictment, only Haves Int' 1
Corp. addressed directly the mental element required in the
light of evidence presented at trial.
It should be noted initially that in the Johnson & Towers
Inc. case neither the trial court nor the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals saw any legal bar to the individual defendants'
culpability under a theory of "aiding and abetting,
"
ieo the
corporation's violations, but the appellate court went even
further and reversed the dismissal of the counts alleging
individual violations of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act by giving a broad reading to the statutory term
"person". 101 The court did not need to or Intend to define the
term knowing under the statute; the dicta focused on ensuring
that each element of the allegation that the defendants "did
knowingly treat, store and dispose of ...hazardous waste" was
subjected to the same "knowing" standard not on defining that
24

knowing standard. 102 Both courts of appeal relied on the same
historic interpretation of "knowing or knowingly" under "public
welfare statutes" 103 establishing regulatory programs. H tT3he
government need prove only knowledge of the actions taken which
constitute the elements of the offense and not knowledge of the
statute forbidding them." 10* That both courts held that
knowledge of the permit status is necessary for the offense of
"knowingly transport [ ing] ... hazardous waste ... to a facility
which does not have a permit" 103 is not surprising" given both
courts recognition of the applicability of inferences and
circumstantial evidence to proof of guilty knowledge. 10* The
court in Johnson & Towers Inc. expressed this concept in general
terms concluding that "triers of fact would have no difficulty
whatever in inferring knowledge on the part of those whose
business it is to know, despite their protestations to the
contrary ," lo:" and the court in Haves Int' 1 . Inc. was even more
explicit when it concluded that in light of the statutory
record-keeping procedures necessarily associated with the legal
transportation of hazardous waste "proving knowledge should not
be diff icult" iee
The Offense of Knowing Endangerment
It is particularly important to note that a similar
rationale may be applied to the "knowing endangerment"
provisions of the Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act. loy It is logical to conclude that even though
25

these statutes authorize severe criminal penalties (a maximum
of 15 years imprisonment and a $250,000 fine for individuals)
the government need not show that the defendant knew the act
alleged to be criminal. The government need only show the
elements of the lesser offenses plus the defendants knowledge
that the act alleged placed "another person in imminent danger
of death or serious bodily harm" l9 ° Presumably because these
offenses are treated so severely, both acts preclude prosecution
based on allegations that the knowledge of another may be
imputed to the defendant, but circumstantial evidence,
including evidence that defendants affirmatively shielded




While extensive academic discussion of the mental element
required may be an interesting exercise, it not one in which
defendants facing felony punishment are likely to profitably
engage, 1 *"2 and the real concerns may be the philosophical
questions about what ought to constitute a crime. The fact
that defendants are often convicted of both the environmental
offenses and more conventional crimes requiring specific intent
makes this conclusion even more compel 1 ing. l93 Assertions that
the defendant believed that the requirements of the statute and
its related regulatory scheme were being satisfied are better
considered as affirmative defenses than as mental elements of




Affirmative defenses may be subdivided into two types-
those based on challenges to the regulations and those based on
the conduct or actions of the defendant. As the first type of
defense is generally a preliminary question for the trial Judge
we will approach our discussion in that same sequence.
The Administrative Challenges
The common administrative law.- challenges in .enforcement
actions, both civil and criminal, may generally be divided
into two categories - challenges to legislative rules, those
issued under implied or explicit statutory authority, and
challenges to interpretive rules, statements which advise the
public of the agency's construction of the statute.
*
9S Though
it is generally conceded that the courts will give greater
deference to legislative rules, the difficulty lies in
establishing which is which and to what extent either type of
rule may be challenged during the criminal enforcement
proceeding. X9A
Because all the principle environmental statutes except
the Toxic Substances Control Act 1 * 7" contain similar provisions
which attempt to preclude review of agency actions after a
relatively limited period of ninety or one hundred twenty
days from Issuance of a given regul at ion , 1 *>e it would appear on
first impression that the statutes and regulations create a
"now or never" system under which court challenges to
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regulations must be presented, If they are to be presented at
all, months or even years prior to any civil or criminal
enforcement action. x " This observation is i 1 lustrated most
dramatically by the all Inclusive wording of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 200
which, when viewed in the light of the extensive regulatory
scheme envisioned201 does not provide the courts with much of an
opportunity to
.
avoid direct confrontation wi.th complex
administrative law issues in civil enforcement actions. But as
the discussion below concludes a more rational and less
formal istic approach may be available in criminal enforcement
proceedings.
This simple approach is made possible in part by the fact
that the courts have seldom approached this issue from the
criminal defendant's end of the bar, choosing instead to
address only indirectly the extent to which Congress may
constitutionally preclude review of agency rules in criminal
enforcement actions, e.g. nullify by statute any rights
defendants may have to challenge the validity of the agency
regulations under which they are charged. 202 Unfortunately,
as we will see below, this approach has also bogged down
resolution of the "review preclusion issue" in questions of
proper venue for review in civil cases203 or formal istic
exercises in statutory construction in criminal cases. 20 "*
The major roadblock to a meaningful recognition of the
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existing due process limits on affirmative defense preclusion
and their effective application is the precedent established by
Yakus v. United States . a 1944 case in which the Supreme Court
rejected constitutional and procedural challenges to the
extensive review preclusion provisions of the Emergency Price
Control Act raised by the appeal of various criminal
convictions under the Act."203 3ecause Yakus was a criminal
case in which review of agency action was affirmatively
precluded, It would nicely support our thesis "if we could
contend unabashedly that Yakus was decided correctly under
administrative law and criminal procedure. Unfortunately, the
confusion created by the case dates to the decision itself.
Succinctly put, it was unclear, even in 1944, whether the
decision in Yakus was a deferral to the "War Power" of Congress
or an exposition of administrative law. 20 ** Any protracted
discussion of the extent of the "War Power" is obviously beyond
the scope of this paper. It suffices to say that any suspension
of procedural due process and other constitutional protection -
if indeed review preclusion provisions operate to that end -
based on the necessities of war making are likely to be subject
to substantial criticism. 205'
Can it then be said that Yakus was/is correct as a
determination of the constitutional limits on review preclusion
when viewed, as it arguably must be, outside the light of the
exercise of the "War Power"? As the dissent of Justice Rut ledge
points out in elegant understatement, "[tlhe idea is entirely
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novel that regulations may have a greater immunity to judicial
scrutiny than statutes have . 2 ° s This fundamental concept
of limitation on review preclusion is so logical that it may
have motivated Congress to later amend the "most onerous
features of the Emergency Price Control Act". 20 * Such concerns
are particularly applicable to criminal proceeding, 210 but It
is not difficult to conceive how the due process or even the
"taking" clauses of the fifth amendment might be used to create
similar concerns in civil proceedings under the federal
environmental statutes. 211 As we shall see, this myriad of ways
in which the issue of review preclusion may be framed presents
the greatest difficulty in civil enforcement actions.
In Adamo Wrecking Co.. v. United States the Supreme Court
recognized, sub rosa, the need for limits on review preclusion
articulated by Justice Rut ledge. By substituting the Courts
definition of "emission standard" for the agency's, the Court
accepted, though admittedly without comment, the argument
that at least one of the basic requirements for validity of
legislative rules, statutory authority, cannot be avoided by
congressional limits on judicial review. The interesting twist
is that a persuasive argument can be made that the rule in
question in Adamo Wrecking Co. was a long-standing interpretive
rule entitled to the force of law under the very exclusive
criteria also recognized by Professor Davis in his treatises on
administrative law. 212 Regardless of outcome of a particular
case, the failure of the Court to recognize and to articulate
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standards for distinguishing between Interpretive and
legislative rules forms the basis for the confusion over the
place, if any, for the legislative/interpretive distinction in
determining the appropriate standard of deference to statutory
review preclusion. 213
Perhaps because of this confusion, due process concerns
have never been adequately addressed. 21-* Although Congress
is beginning to recognize that given the complexity of
environmental regulations, the relatively brief periods provided
prior to review preclusion may not be sufficient. 2185 It is
clearly not enough to simply chronologically extend the period
prior to preclusion. Such provisions are certainly relevant in
determining the adequacy of the opportunity to be heard, but
they cannot be considered conclusive on the adequacy of due
process. 21 ** The Environmental Protection Agency has attempted
to avoid this issue, by denominating its own rules as either
interpretive or legislative. If they are recognized by the
courts, such classifications would virtually compel potential
defendants to seek review of legislative rules immediately but
allow post- enforcement challenges to site specific or clearly
interpretive rules. 217' While such designations should be very
helpful to civil enforcement, this approach suffers from one
very serious flaw. The validity of such efforts can only be
established after enforcement actions are begun. 2ie
Rather than embroil ourselves in this minutia of
procedural due process under administrative law necessitated by
31

civil enforcement, it seems more efficient to avail ourselves of
the standards of reasonableness generally utilized in early
criminal prosecutions under environmental statutes21 * and later
reaffirmed, though perhaps tangent lal ly, in United State v.
Haves IntM Corp. . 220 Review preclusion was not directly
considered in the Haves decision, but it is not difficult to
see concern for fundamental due process issues of notice
disguised as issues of "knowledge" under the statute 221 and
rejection of the "mistake of law"- defense with- regard to
ignorance of the applicable disposal regulations. In the end
the court concluded that it was the defendant's "business to
know" applicable regulations and to ensure compliance. 222 It
is unlikely that such a clear result could be produced by a
civil enforcement action. 223 As further evidence of this
conclusion, let us look more closely at other affirmative
defenses.
The Mistake of Law
How was I supposed to know? — was a frequent cry of
defendants in the early days of environmental enforcement. In
civil actions Judges often mitigated what they saw as strict
liability statutes by awarding nominal penalties, 22-* but under
the criminal enforcement statutes the courts, relying on
precedent established in the regulation of the transportation of
dangerous substances and other pervasively regulated
industries, 22= have generally concluded that under
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environmental statutes "Et]he principle that Ignorance of the
law Is no defense applies whether the law is a statute or a
duly promulgated and published regulation." 23*
As prosecutions based on this principle became more
numerous, a wag, questioning the deterrent value of criminal
enforcement, declared that the prosecutions of adultery and
violations of environmental statutes had three things in
common. "Enforcement is selective and erratic, and the
consequences often are harsh." 227" Despite its humorous appeal,
selective prosecution, unless it is "deliberately based upon an
unjustifiable standard," 228 is founded upon the questionable
philosophical conclusion that if enforcement agencies are
sufficiently derelict or if detection is particularly difficult
society is somehow deprived of its right to expect compliance
with the law. 22 ** Additionally, while intellectual recognition
of the potential for a valid "selective prosecution" defense is
not uncommon the assertion of such claims has historically
enjoyed little practical recognition in the courts, especially
in felony cases. 230 Interestingly enough, a perhaps more
viable defense, "mistake of fact," recognized in the early
days of criminal enforcement has lately been ignored. Let us
examine the concept of mistake of fact founded in detrimental
reliance upon third parties.
The Mistake of Fact
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the
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validity of this defense. In an early Refuse Act case the
Court held that the defendant corporation had been improperly
denied its right to "present evidence in support of its claim
that it had been affirmatively misled [by representatives of
the Corps of Engineers] into believing that the discharges in
question were not a violation of the statute." 231 Government
attorneys are still keenly aware of this possibility.
Representatives of the Department of Justice have recently been
admonished against providing "legal advice" to* potential
criminal defendants. 232 Since claims of mistaken reliance
will normally be decided as questions of fact, 233 criminal
enforcement actions conducted with even a modicum of common
sense should not be unduly hampered.
Apparently, reliance on enforcement or permitting authority
representatives is also a problem in the civil enforcement
area, particularly when state and federal officials are
attempting to obtain compliance from the same polluter. 23 ** But
as we shall see below, affirmative defenses, such as mistake of
fact, may arise much more subtly in civil enforcement actions
particularly when the regulatory scheme is a very complex
one. 233
The Special Defenses
In addition to the affirmative defenses discussed above,
which are generally applicable to all environmental crimes, some
special defenses applicable to the offenses involving "knowing
34

endangerment" 2a* have been provided or at least hinted at by
statute. 237' While only the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act contains all the express provisions, they are likely to be
grafted Into other statutes In the future for two reasons.
First, as we have already noted, environmental statutes seem
generally to build on one another, 238 and secondly, the
provisions, with two marked exceptions, appear to simply state
the obvious and relinquish refinement to case law development.
These marked exceptions warrant closer inspection. The
statutes recognize consent of the person endangered as a
defense providing "the danger and the conduct charged were
reasonably foreseeable hazards of an occupation" or "medical
treatment or medical or scientific experimentation" conducted by
professionally approved methods and with the endangered
person's consent. 23 *" The statute attempts to shift the burden
of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to the defendant.
The issue of such manipulations of the historic reasonable
doubt standards go far beyond environmental statutes. 2* It is
sufficient for our purposes to note the existence and necessity
of resolution of the issue. The unique affirmative defense
provisions of The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act also
include a mention of the common law defenses under "concepts of
Justification and excuse." 2 "* 1 Because this provision may
merely state the obvious, we will next consider in general
terms this type of defense, which the courts will likely extend




Assertions of justification or excuse as affirmative
defenses sometimes present themselves as the concept of
supervisory liability or its inverse, innocent obedience to
instructions or orders. Obviously this situation immediately
presents a conflict of interest between the employee, intent on
invoking ignorant compliance with corporate (or federal
facility) 2 " 3 directives, and the corporate or federal activity
intent on avoiding responsibility for the criminal acts of its
servants. 2"" The courts have had little patience with corporate
attempts to avoid criminal liability through allegation of
lack of knowledge or by urging formal istlc constructions of the
statutes2 "* 55 and appear just as ready to sustain convictions
of individuals in the managerial hierarchy, sometimes relying
on the doctrine of the "responsible corporate officer." 2 "**
Whether or not individual defendants may avail themselves of
some sort of unknowing-obedience-to-instructions defense has
been mired in discussions of the mental element necessary to
commit specific offenses2 "* 7" and has not been clearly addressed
as an affirmative defense issue. Because active duty members of
the armed forces have an affirmative legal duty to obey
presumably lawful orders, prosecution of member of the military
for environmental crimes may produce a resolution of this
issue. 2 * e
The defense of Justification or excuse may also take the
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form of reliance on the natural occurrence or acts of third
parties as the actual cause of the illegal release, discharge,
or emission. Such a defense is already recognized in terms of
civil liability for Superfund cleanups. 3 "** But because It Is
often easier to convince the triers of fact to punish everyone
who had a hand in an illegal activity than to convince them
that blame may somehow be rationally or legally terminated,
the defense of excuse based upon the actions of third parties
is likely to be combined with the issue of causation to the
defendant's ultimate disadvantage. 230
There is one other circumstance, which the author hesitates
to mention given the current notoriety in the popular press of
the failure of government employees and contractors to disclose
their actions, much less answer for them criminally, 231 that
may give rise to the "Justification" defense. This concept
revolves around the justification for or excuse of violations of
the law committed in the interest of "national security." 232
Considering that the issue has not yet been addressed by the
courts, it is enough to note that such claims, if they are
legally cognizable, may be readily asserted by many federal
facilities and/or federal employees. 233 However, the various
statutory provisions which permit the President to exempt
facilities which are of paramount importance to the United
States23 '* may be interpreted to condemn as criminal acts
decisions to ignore emission, discharge, and reporting
standards made in the lower echelons of government.
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The Defenses In Civil Actions
After such a prolonged discussion, one might readily argue
that the mere existence of the concept of affirmative defenses
warrants preference for civil enforcement. Such an argument
overlooks the fact that for agency imposed penalties in a
civil enforcement scheme, proceedings similar to a trial on the
issue of guilt or innocence, including the concept of
affirmative defenses, are often bound together with* what is in
effect a sentencing determination under the statutes. 25"5
Those imposing civil penalties are required to consider:
the seriousness of the viol at ion(s)
;
the economic benefit to the violator;
the history of violations (if any) by the same "person";
the good faith efforts of the violator to comply;
the economic impact of the penalty on the violator; and,
other matters which justice may require. 255*
It is 'not difficult to see that the affirmative defenses
discussed above pale in comparison to the complexity of this
civil scheme, particularly if a jury trial on the issue of the
imposition of penalties is required. 255 " The separation of the
legal concepts relevant to determination of guilt integral to
criminal proceeding and perhaps to due process under Uni ted
States v. Tul
i
2Se greatly simplifies the decision making
process, but even more importantly, criminal enforcement
provides the deterrent of conviction of the individual
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wrongdoer, regardless of sentence, and the potential for a
punishment which fits the more heinous crimes. 23 *
PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES AND DISTINCTIONS
The conventional wisdom has long been that the criminal
law provides ingenious defense attorneys with rich ground for
the discovery or perhaps invention of procedural roadblocks to
effective enforcement of environmental statutes. 2* These
can conceivably range from preliminary chal lenges /to venue 2* 1
to collateral challenges to convictions under environmental
statutes. 2 *2 (One might easily include evidentiary issues in
this category, but they have been reserved for discussion
below.) While conclusions about the complexity of criminal
enforcement may seem valid on cursory inspection, the
interjection of procedural issues standing alone does not
necessarily denote complexity. A review of the procedural
decisions associated with criminal enforcement may rebut hasty
conclusions and demonstrate, with the few inevitable
exceptions, the inherent logic and simplicity of criminal
enforcement
.
The Choice Between Criminal and Civil Enforcement
Despite numerous early challenges, It is now generally
accepted that the government is not required to seek civil
remedies prior to the initiation of criminal actions under
environmental statutes. 2 *3 Similarly, the fact that the
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Congress "created a unique situation in which a defendant is
automatically liable for a civil penalty when he follows the
only route available [notification] to avoid criminal
prosecution "a** i S not a bar to criminal proceeding for
failing to report the release or for the criminal act
itself . 2*= it is not so clear to what extent criminal and
civil enforcement actions may proceed simultaneously, 2** but
the fact that the regulatory scheme is constantly being defined
by both civil and criminal actions does not create ex post
facto definitions of criminal acts. 2* 7.
Concerns about the coordinated preparation of civil and
criminal cases against the same defendant may be more of an
evidentiary issue than procedural one 2*e , but even if the
government is compelled to elect an enforcement process, neither
form of enforcement is necessarily preferable merely because a
choice must be made. In short the presence of two enforcement
systems may complicate the regulators decision making process,
but the parallel systems do not unduly complicate the criminal
process.
The Grand Jury Process
A principle procedural requirement among the "heightened
constitutional protection" afforded criminal defendants in
environmental cases is the grand jury process, 2 **1 but the
presentation of the case to the panel is not a roadblock to
criminal enforcement; it is an Integral part of the trial
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preparation process In which the United States Attorney is,
with the sanction of the courts, intimately involved. 2 '' The
failure of the grand jury to return an Indictment is the
exception rather than the rule. 27" 1 Defense attorneys know
this and often permit the government to proceed on an
"information" by waiving the indictment, 27"2 and if the
punishment for the offense can not exceed imprisonment for one
year (environmental statutes in this category include Clean Air
Act violations and negligent violations of the^lean Water
Act) 27*3 the government may elect this option without the
defense's consent. 27"*
There are of course pitfalls in the grand jury process,
and sometimes these are related to parallel civil actions. 27"
Such problems are, however, more likely to delay rather than
prevent criminal enforcement and may be avoided altogether
under the Justice Department Guidelines discussed above. 27><i In
summary, the grand Jury process is a constitutionally necessary
step, 27" 7" but as an ex parte proceeding it is likely to be more
effective and less complex than extensive civil discovery . 27>e
This is true because the grand jury process and subsequent
trial are governed in part by the federal Speedy Trial Act. 27"*"
While the Speedy Trial Act is not the panacea Congress had
hoped for, it does help to prevent undue delay in criminal
trials, 230 and it is safe to conclude that criminal trials




The Post-Conviction Collateral Attack
As we have seen, historically the courts have simply
rebuffed the invocation of procedural devices to thwart criminal
enforcement and what might be construed as procedural burdens
have in effect been assets in the enforcement process. A
recent collateral attack on criminal enforcement based on
procedural challenges was also unsuccessful, though the
defendant corporation alleged everything from "technical
incompetence" to "obstruction of J-ustice" to supp'ort Federal
Tort Claim actions based on tortuous initiation of criminal
prosecutions. 281 These allegations appear to be more in the
nature of an affirmative defense of "selective prosecution," 202
but the defendant, later the plaintiff, did not raise such a
defense at the criminal trial because of a guilty plea. The
government, perhaps in an effort to resolve the substantive
issue, did not attempt to assert collateral estoppel, and the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit relied on the
"discretionary function exception" to invoke sovereign immunity




Criminal enforcement actions always carry with them
concerns generated by both the exclusionary rule's protection of
the defendants' constitutional rights against illegal searches
and self-incrimination. 26 '* These concerns are magnified by the
parallel enforcement actions available under the principle
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environmental statutes283 and the fact that a great deal of
the evidence in many environmental cases is collected directly
from reports and documents which potential defendants are
required to submit under threat of other sanct ions. 26**
The Issues in Parallel Enforcement Actions
The courts have recognized the evidentiary Issues created
by parallel environmental enforcement and have generally
held that, with the significant- statutory exception of
notification information required by The Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act and
the spill provisions in section 311 of the Clean Water Act, 287"
evidence gathered during normal monitoring activities or during
civil proceeding may be used in criminal enforcement
efforts. 2es Unfortunately for civil enforcement, the reverse
is not necessarily true. While there is no evidentiary bar to
the use of "information obtained in civil or administrative
discovery" in criminal enforcement "provided there was a good
faith civil basis for conducting the discovery"
,
2B *' the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure deny attorneys involved in civil
enforcement access to records or accounts of grand Jury
proceedings, unless the court is willing, in the interest of
furthering a related judicial proceeding, to order the matters
released. 2S> ° This generally requires at least one in camera
review by a federal district judge. 2 *11
The virtually unbridled use of statements and other
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evidence obtained In civil proceeding for criminal enforcement
purposes is particularly noteworthy because guidelines within
the Justice Department do not require that those involved
in Civil enforcement give "Miranda Warnings" to suspected
offenders, 2 *'2 and the prerequisites necessary to obtain
warrants pursuant to a pervasive regulatory statute are not
constitutionally based and are principally determined by
the governmental agency concerned. 2S>3 In addition to these
sources of evidence, Dow Chemical Co. -v. United States , decided
by the Supreme Court in 1986, upheld the warrantless overflight
of Dow's well-guarded manufacturing facility and sharply
demonstrated the inspection power of the Environmental
Protection Agency under the Clean Air Act. 2 *"4 When evidence can
be collected in this manner criminal prosecution of offenses
committed wi thin "pervasively regulated Industries" is greatly
simplified. 2 * 55
The Distinction of Substantive Concerns
No comment on evidentiary issues in environmental
enforcement would be complete without a mention of the
Ringelmann Number, a method of judging pollution by the opacity
of smoke. Upheld by the Supreme Court as a valid basis for the
implementation of civil sanctions by the State of Col orado, 2 *><s>
it has long been decried by experts in the field as little
better than sniffing the air. 2 " 7' The point for our purposes is
not the scientific validity of the test in terms of what is
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measured, that is an issue for the law makers.
The Ringelmann chart was and still is used in a manner
which is, in practical effect, no different than determining
the amount of a pollutant or hazardous substance we will permit
to be discharged measured in parts per quadrillion. 2 * No
doubt tomorrow's technology will make today's technical
wizardry look equally archaic. Or perhaps we are controlling,
as is likely to be the case with the Ringelmann Charts, the
wrong thing al together .*" Regardless, an enforcement scheme
should focus only on the statutory objective. Criminal
enforcement, with its historic separation from value judgments,
is often best suited to that task, and in certain instances
criminal enforcement is the only viable sanction.
THREE EXAMPLES
Having established a framework for analysis of certain
factual situations, we return to three specific categories of
polluters which present serious challenges to enforcement
efforts and provide the best examples of the value of criminal
enforcement to achieve statutory objectives.
The Midnight Dumper300
From a historical perspective it appears that during the
early days of environmental enforcement most industrial
concerns, including some of America's largest corporations,
were midnight dumpers in the sense that they ignored the few
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existing restrictions and seldom considered the environmental
impact of their actions. 301 Of course, the term midnight
dumper would have to be used in an allegorical sense, because
no one paid any attention to the time of day. Prosecutions
under an emerging system of environmental regulation changed
this approach of reckless abandon and haphazard prosecution and
the first real success stories of felony criminal prosecution
under environmental statutes involved the prosecution of those,
who with more ingenuity than regard for others,eoz simply
ignored the requirements of the law. 303 Those of an optimistic
bent might assume that as the scheme of regulation of disposal
of substances, particularly hazardous ones, becomes more and
more pervasive, 30 "* potential wrong-doers would become more
sensitized to the criminality and environmental impact of their
acts and that arguably draconian measures like criminal
prosecution would no longer be necessary, but In fact the
opposite may be true. 303
Only one thing can truly be said about all waste which the
body politic elects to regulate — eventually something has to
be done with it. Even the decision to just let it sit (remain,
lie, or puddle) may now constitute a criminal act, 30 ** and with
every update of the statutory scheme, more and more individuals
are added to the list of potential defendants. It is simply an
observation of human nature to conclude that as legal disposal
of waste becomes more and more expensive and difficult, some
will attempt to avoid the law altogether. 307' These crimes,
46

despite the ingenious methods by which they may be committed or
concealed, are not legally complex. The perpetrators are not
interested in understanding, complying with, or even
challenging a complex administrative scheme; they simply seek,
illegally of course, to avoid it altogether. For such simple
offenses with so obvious a criminal intent, 303 the simple
sanction of the swift imposition of criminal penalties is the
best approach.
The Unrepentant Polluter
The genesis of this brand of criminal enforcement was the
recognition by those responsible for environmental protection,
that toleration of deliberate actions by persons conducting
regulated activities to mislead or even deliberately deceive the
Environmental Protection Agency would quickly undermine all
enforcement efforts. 30 * Some of the activities prosecuted
constituted deliberate frauds on the government and the
brashness of the criminals is now nearly legendary, 310 but the
submission of misleading or false reports is not the only
manner in which this situation can arise.
Some activities file correct reports hoping that only
"jawboning" 311 or at worst, because of the wrong-doer's obvious
cooperation, only minimal civil sanctions wi 1 1 be invoked. 312
Why would a polluter clearly but il logically assume that
illegal acts will be Ignored simply because they are
religiously confessed? Often the unrepentant polluter relies on
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the practical Inability or political reluctance of the
Environmental Protection Agency to apply the civil equivalent
of the death penalty, i.e. a comprehensive injunction or
economic penalties so great that the polluting concern can no
longer operate or is no longer competitive in the market
place. 313 It is truly a shame that the polluter is often
correct
.
While modern proponents of criminal enforcement do not
have the death penalty at their - disposal
,
31 "* enforcement
efforts to evoke the substantial criminal penalties available
may be the only practical method of meeting, head on, the
problems of ensuring compliance with the ever expanding
regulatory system. For example, the "Loss of Interim Status"
(LOIS) program, designed to implement the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, will undoubtedly produce numerous enforcement
actions as operators of designated sites promise that which
they cannot deliver. 3155 As these sites close or are closed,
the "owners and operators" will no doubt attempt to convince
civil enforcement authorities that there is simply nothing to
do with the waste. 31 * Criminal statutes do not, for better or
worse, consider such practical or economic issues, and if we
are to place the burden of solving these problems, where it
arguably belongs, on the public and their legislative
representatives, then we must deter what has legislatively been
determined to be unacceptable conduct by use of the retributive




The States, often in the van of criminal enforcement,
have long used their "police powers" for environmental
regul at ion t 31 * but in the last two decades, Congress under
considerable political pressure and concerned by what it
considered to be "inadequate state enforcement of environmental
standards" began to enact federal statutes to improve the
environment
.
31 B For several years after the initial federal
laws, the states generally accepted their subordinate role of
supplying the "police power" to create or enforce regulations
implementing these "commerce clause" statutes in exchange for
federal monies. 31 ^ This system utilized under all the major
environmental statutes seemed to work well until the choices
"began to bind" 320 and the margin cost for compliance became
greater and greater. As the demands of the various federal
programs increased, the states became more aggressive in their
criminal enforcement efforts. 321 It was then that the states
and the media began to notice that despite lip service by the
Executive Branch directing compliance with all state and
federal environmental laws, 322 the federal government might be
"the biggest violator". 323
It is significant to note that at least in California,
which has a strong tradition of criminal enforcement, 32-*
attention turned to criminal actions against an agency of the
United States and the federal employee responsible for the
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actions of the agency. 323 In California v. Walters the
municipal attorney for the City of Los Angles attempted to
prosecute the Veterans Administration and Dr. Walters, the
administrator of the local medical center. In municipal court,
for violations of the state statutes implementing the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act by making the Improper disposal
of hazardous medical wastes a criminal act. 32* The complaint
relied on the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act-. 327"
The municipal court action did not last long, the case was
immediately removed to federal court by the defendants, not
under federal question jurisdiction, 328 but under provisions
of the United States Code which permit Federal Officers sued or
prosecuted for actions "under color of ... office or on account
of any right, title or authority claimed under any act of
Congress" to remove the prosecution to federal district
court. 32 " Applying the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 330
the District Court dismissed the complaint on the grounds of
"sovereign immunity" without opinion. 331 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit rejected California's assertions that
provisions of the act were drafted In light of the strict
construction of statutory waivers espoused by the Supreme
Court in Hancock v. Train . 332 and in a brief per curiam opinion
found no "clear intent [by Congress] to waive immunity from
criminal sanctions". 333
Because district courts have generally followed the
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Cal 1 fornlft y t Wal ters requirement for a clear and unambiguous
waiver of immunity and refused to find such a waiver even for
civil penalties or fines, 33 * environmental enforcement by the
states has been effectively limited to the injunctive relief
permitted by dicta in California v. Walters . 330 and as we have
seen, injunctive relief is often politically and practically
unavailable. This is particularly true when concerns of
Federalism are involved. 33*
To date administrative efforts by the Environmental
Protection Agency to regulate federal facilities have not fared
much better than state criminal and civil efforts, 33^ and
though a new compliance strategy has just been issued, 333
administrative enforcement without at least the reasonable
availability of sanctions is not likely to be ef f ect ive. 33 *'
This observation is particularly important for our purposes as
civil enforcement is presently not available from the federal
courts either. The Justice Department has refused time and
again to bring civil actions under the principle environmental
protection statutes against federal agencies and facilities,
citing the "unitary theory of the executive branch," 3 '* which
asserts that such cases are actually a suit by the government
against itself which does not produce a "case in controversy"
required by the constitution to impart Jurisdiction. 3-* 1
Similarly, the courts have rejected "citizen suits" by the
states as beyond the scope of the enforcement scheme
contemplated by Congress. 3 ** 2 Is there then no manner by which
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the law may be enforced?
Apparently Congress or at least the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce is convinced that there Is not. Obviously
sincere In their adherence to the adage "that the whole
Constitution has been erected upon the assumption that the King
not only is capable of wrong, but is more likely to do wrong
than other men if he is given a chance," 3-*3 members of the
committee have introduced3"* and the committee has favorably
reported legislation to create -a "Special Environmental
Counsel" empowered to bring enforcement actions against federal
f aci 1 i t ies. 3a= Unfortunately, for environmental enforcement
there is no indication that such civil enforcement actions
would be any more effective or expeditious than their
counterparts directed against large private corporations.
Financial penalties directed at the facility are not likely to
strike fear in the hearts of irresponsible employees and
injunctive relief is also impractical. It appears that, for the
moment at least, the only way compliance by federal facilities
may be encouraged by federal court action is the direct
criminal prosecution of federal facility employees and federal
contractors and their employees. 3-*'* Such prosecutions are
already underway. 3 *''
It would very much appear that as a society we should want
it the other way around. We desire that our government
employees, deterred from criminal conduct by retributive
sanctions, report the potential for violations of the
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environmental laws to superiors sensitive to correcting the
problem. Some argue that more extensive job protection for
"whistle-blowers" will resolve this dilemma, 3 * but the
principle environmental statutes already contain pervasive
employee protection provisions. 3 '**' Perhaps a diligent criminal
enforcement effort is the only viable method of producing the
desired result.
CONCLUSION
By now it is obvious to the reader that the three examples
of enforcement problems are merely representative. In fact the
three categories are not even mutually exclusive. For the
present federal facilities and/or their employees may enjoy at
least partial immunity from sanctions which might be imposed on
other midnight dumpers or unrepentant permit holder, and the
permit holder who is unwilling to comply with the terms of the
legal license may turn to deliberate unlawful disposal. Nearly
all categorizations within extensive schemes of federal
regulation may be subjected to such cri t icisms, 3= ° but discrete
categorization of wrongdoers, while helpful in understanding
the desirability of a certain enforcement approach, is not
essential to effective implementation of that approach.
General characterizations are, however, valuable if they
persuade us by a demonstration of otherwise unregulated
activities to the logic of and need for a comprehensive scheme
of criminal enforcement of environmental laws regardless
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of the station of the wrongdoer. Such a comprehensive scheme
is available under existing laws. Congress has determined that
the existing environmental crimes are serious offenses331 and
appears ready to add other crimes to the felony category . a=52
But additional statutes and greater potential punishments are
not necessarily effective merely because they exist. If we do
not unduly burden ourselves with philosophical baggage and if
we avoid knee-jerk rejections of retributive enforcement just
because it is more difficult to -quantify its value as a
deterrent
,
3553 we can as a society effectively implement
the laws we already have to protect from the few that which
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